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Abstract
This paper considers the sealed bid and ascending auction, which both identiﬁes
the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where truthful preference revelation
constitutes an equilibrium. Even though these auction formats share many theoretical
properties, there are behavioral aspects that are not easily captured. To explore this
issue in more detail, this paper experimentally investigates what role the design of the
auction format has for its outcome. The results suggest that the sealed bid mechanism
performs weakly better in all of investigated measures (consistent reporting, eﬃciency
etc.). In addition, we ﬁnd that the performance of the ascending auction is increasing
over time, whereas the sealed bid auction shows no such tendency.
JEL Classication: C91; D44.
Key Words: Auctions; Non-manipulability; Eﬃciency; Experiments.
1 Introduction
Auctions are common practice, when allocating and pricing scarce resources, on a
variety of markets. Examples include the markets for spectrum licences, debts, emis-
sions and commodities (e.g. ﬁsh, wool, timber etc.). The insight that the Vickrey–
Clarke–Groves (VCG) sealed bid auction generates an ex post eﬃcient outcome that
in addition provides bidders with the incentives to truthfully reveal their preferences
has motivated a substantial amount of research.
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1In particular, Demange and Gale (1985) and Leonard (1983) consider a VCG
multi-item auction that identiﬁes the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector
and use it as a mechanism to allocate the items among the bidders. In such auctions,
it is a weakly dominant strategy for the bidders to report their true valuations given
that they wish to acquire at most one item (unit–demand bidders). A competing auc-
tion format is the ascending bid auction, where the multi-item auction from Demange
et al. (1986) is a prominent example. Under this format the unit–demand bidders
gradually reveal information about their demand sets until the mechanism converges.
Also this mechanism identiﬁes the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector and
truthful bidding is an ex post equilibrium given a set of simple rules that guarantee
a speciﬁc structure on the bids (see de Vries et al., 2007; Mishra and Parkes, 2007;
and the more detailed discussion in Section 2.2).
Because the multi-item auctions in both the sealed bid and the ascending format
identify the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector and have the property that
truthful bidding constitutes an equilibrium they are theoretically equivalent in terms
of predictions. However, there are many behavioral aspects of these two formats
that are not easily captured. In particular, they diﬀer in terms of e.g. how much
information that is revealed about the bidders’ valuations, how complex the format
is and how information about other bidders’ behavior is transmitted (see Cramton,
1998 for a discussion). Ex ante it is not evident if and how these aspects aﬀect
the outcome of the auction formats. Hence, it is natural to take the theory to
data. Because we are not aware of any ”real world” situation where the two auction
formats are conducted in comparable contexts, the evaluation is best done by way of
an economic experiment. Moreover, the experimental method enables us to have a
more strict control over valuations, which is pivotal for the theoretical predictions.
To investigate what role the design of the auction format has for its outcome, we
conducted an experiment with the sealed bid (Demange and Gale, 1985; Leonard,
1983) and the ascending (Demange et al., 1986) auction format as treatments. Over-
all we ﬁnd that the sealed bid mechanism performs weakly better in the measures
reported here (i.e., consistent reporting, eﬃciency and assignment of items). The
results also conﬁrm previous ﬁndings that subjects typically report non-truthful.1
Moreover, for all investigated measures, there is a signiﬁcantly positive time trend in
the ascending treatment but not in the sealed bid treatment.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
two auction formats. Section 3 describes the experimental design and implementa-
tion. Section 4 contains the main results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
1See e.g. Attiyeh et al. (2000), Harstad (2000), Kagel et al. (1987), Kawagoe and Mori (2001) and
Kagel and Levin (1993) for similar results.
22 Auction Formats
Let the set of bidders and items be denoted by B = {1;:::;n} and I = {1;:::;m},
respectively. Each item i ∈ I has a price pi ≥ 0 where without loss of generality
pi = 0 represents the sellers’ reservation price. The prices are gathered in the vector
p = (p1;:::;pm). The private value of item i ∈ I to bidder b ∈ B is represented
by vbi. Consequently, each bidder b ∈ B is characterized by a vector of type vb =
(vb1;:::;vbm). There is also an unlimited number of ”no items” (denoted by 0) whose
prices and values always equal zero. The demand set for bidder b ∈ B at prices p is
deﬁned by:
Db(p) = {i ∈ I ∪ {0} : vbi − pi ≥ vbj − pj for all j ∈ I ∪ {0}}:
A price vector p is said to be a Walrasian equilibrium price vector if there is an
assignment x : B  → I such that xb ∈ Db(p) for all b ∈ B and xb ̸= xb′ if b′ ̸= b and
{xb;xb′} ⊆ I, i.e., each bidder is assigned an item from his demand set and each item
diﬀerent from the ”no item” can be assigned to at most one bidder. The pair (p;x)
is a Walrasian equilibrium if p is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector and if xb ̸= i
for all b ∈ B then pi = 0, i.e., if an item is not assigned to any bidder, then its price
must equal reservation price. As demonstrated by Shapley and Shubik (1972) the
set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors is non-empty and forms a complete lattice.
Thus, the existence of a unique minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector pmin is
guaranteed.
2.1 The Sealed Bid Format
In the sealed bid mechanism (Demange and Gale, 1985; Leonard, 1986) each bidder
b ∈ B reports his values of the items ˆ vb to the auctioneer. This report may be truthful
or not but based on it the auctioneer identiﬁes the minimum Walrasian equilibrium
price vector ˆ pmin by solving a simple LP-problem. Given that ˆ pmin is used as a
mechanism to allocate the items among the bidders, the sealed bid auction has a
(weakly) dominant strategy equilibrium where each bidder b ∈ B reports ˆ vb = vb.




2.2 The Ascending Format
The ascending bid auction (Demange et al., 1986) diﬀers from the sealed bid auction
in the sense that bidders do not submit a report of type ˆ vb as in the latter. Instead,
3bidders gradually reveal information about their demand sets, for given price vectors,
until the ascending mechanism converges. To formalize the procedure, let the set of
bidders demanding only items in the set S ⊆ I at prices p be denoted by C(S;p) =
{b ∈ B : Db(p) ⊆ S}. A set of items S is said to be overdemanded if the number of
bidders demanding only items in this set is greater than the number of items in the
set, i.e., if |S| < |C(S;p)|. An overdemanded set with the property that none of its
proper subsets is overdemanded is called a minimal overdemanded set.
The ascending mechanism can be described as follows. The auctioneer announces
a price vector p. Each bidder then reports (truthful or not) his demand set ˆ D(p).2 If
there is no over demanded set of items, the mechanism terminates. Otherwise, prices
are increased for an arbitrary minimal overdemanded set of items according to some
rule.3 The procedure is repeated until the family of overdemanded sets is empty.
As demonstrated by Demange et al. (1986), this procedure will always identify an
eﬃcient minimum Walrasian price equilibria in a ﬁnite number of iterations given
that reports are truthful in each iteration. In addition, truthful reports constitute
an equilibrium given that bids are consistent with some activity rule4 (Vries et al.,
2007; Mishra and Parkes, 2007).
3 Experimental Design and Implementation
The experiment was conducted at Lund University in September 2010. We ran four
separate sessions consisting either of a sealed bid- (S) or an ascending (A) multi-item
auction treatment. In total 117 subjects participated (60 in treatment S and 57 in
treatment A). The subjects were students at the introductory or intermediate level
in Economics at Lund University. Instructions were given both written and aloud to
the subjects at the beginning of the experiment.5 We also conducted a test period
in order for the subjects to familiarize with the software.
At the beginning of the session, subjects were randomly assigned to a bidder type
(1, 2 or 3) and a group consisting of three subjects of diﬀerent type. Each three-
person group was ﬁxed in all 10 periods of the session. All subjects knew that they
2If this set contains more than one item, the bidder is indiﬀerent between all reported items.
3Such a rule may be to increase the price of all items in the selected minimal overdemanded set S by
one unit (Demange et al., 1986) or to ask the agents that only demand items from the set S to report the
minimum price increase that would make them indiﬀerent to an item outside S (Andersson and Andersson,
2011). This paper adopts the latter rule.
4The meaning of an activity rule is that bidders not are allowed to submit conﬂicting reports across the
iterations of the ascending procedure. For example, if bidder b reveals that ˆ vbi − ˆ vbi′ ≥  for some  ∈ N
in iteration t, then it cannot be the case that the very same bidder reveals that ˆ vbi − ˆ vbi′ <  in some
subsequent iteration t + k.
5A transcript of the instructions is available in Appendix B
4were grouped with two other participants, but could not discern who they were.
The subjects were informed that they would participate in an auction over three
items (denoted by 1, 2 and 3). In particular, they were given the information that
if they were awarded item 1, 2 or 3, then (i) they have to pay a price and (ii) the
item will automatically be resold at the end of the period at a predetermined price
called the resale value. The resale values vb of bidder type b ∈ {1;2;3} for items




























The resale value of the ”no item” was zero. Each subject knew his/her resale
values but not the resale values of the other two participants. Truthful reports under
both treatment S and A given (1) yields the assignment (x1;x2;x3) = (3;2;1) with
corresponding minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices (p1;p2;p3) = (0;20;60), i.e.,
bidder type 1 is assigned item x1 = 3 at price p3 = 60 and so on.
The subjects in treatments S and A received the following information of how the
mechanism worked:
”The prices for items 1, 2 and 3 will be determined automatically by a
computer program according to a predetermined rule which is based on
the reports of all three members of the group.”
As previously explained in Section 2, these reports was given by a vector of type
ˆ vb in treatment S and the reported demand sets in each iteration of the ascending
mechanism under treatment A. Similarly, the only information given to the subjects
regarding which item they will be assigned was the following treatment equivalent
information:
”Each group member will be awarded the item where the diﬀerence be-
tween the stated valuation and the calculated price is the highest.”[Treat-
ment S]
”If each group member can be assigned an item from his/her reported
demand set, the auction is terminated” [Treatment A]
The payoﬀ in each period was given by the diﬀerence between the resale value
of the item assigned to the subject and its price. If the subject was assigned ”no
item”, the payoﬀ was zero. At the end of the experiment, the accumulated payoﬀs
were converted into Swedish kronor according to an exchange rate of 1 experimental
5currency unit = 0.5 SEK.6 Subjects received a show-up fee of 50 SEK and the average
earnings were 314 SEK. A session took approximately 45 minutes to conduct.
4 Results
We start by an analyzing the of subjects’ reporting behavior.7;8 Following Olson
and Porter (1994) we deﬁne a measure of consistent reporting as follows: In the S
treatment we say that a report is consistent if the order of ˆ vb preserves the order of
vb for subject b. For example, if the subject has valuation proﬁle 1 then we require
that ˆ v13 > ˆ v12 = ˆ v11 for the report ˆ v to be consistent. In the A treatment we
say that a report is consistent if ˆ Db(p) = Db(p) where ˆ Db(p) and Db(p) are the
reported and the true demand set for subject b at prices p, respectively. Subjects
that report inconsistent and consistent are assigned the values 0 and 1, respectively,
in the consistency measure. As a consequence, the average consistency measure for
a sample of subjects always belongs to the closed interval [0;1].
Table 1: Mean values for the investigated measures.
Consistency Equilibria Eﬃciency
Period A S A S A S
1 0.19 0.53 0.11 0.60 0.69 0.96
2 0.18 0.48 0.26 0.45 0.81 0.94
3 0.33 0.57 0.37 0.65 0.86 0.95
4 0.39 0.63 0.32 0.60 0.89 0.95
5 0.35 0.58 0.42 0.45 0.90 0.93
6 0.37 0.60 0.42 0.25 0.91 0.85
7 0.33 0.48 0.42 0.45 0.89 0.93
8 0.40 0.55 0.47 0.50 0.92 0.94
9 0.41 0.53 0.37 0.45 0.92 0.93
10 0.37 0.57 0.53 0.55 0.94 0.95
All periods 0.33 0.55 0.37 0.50 0.87 0.93
Period 1–5 0.29 0.56 0.29 0.55 0.83 0.94
Period 6–10 0.38 0.55 0.44 0.44 0.91 0.92
The average consistency measures for the two treatments are reported in columns
2 and 3 of Table 1. A ﬁrst observation is that the average consistency measure is
6At the time of experiment 1 SEK ≈ 0.11 EUR.
7In order to facilitate a comparison between treatments S and A we only analyze the ﬁnal iteration in
A.
8For the interested reader Table 5 in Appendix A reports the average prices by period and treatment
for each item.
6well below the equilibrium prediction (i.e. 1.00), which should not come as a sur-
prise given the ﬁndings of previous experimental papers (see footnote 1). A second
observation is that the S treatment has a higher degree of consistency in every pe-
riod. To facilitate a statistical comparison between the two treatments the average
consistency within each three-person group was calculated. In this way 39 indepen-
dent observations (20 in treatment S and 19 in treatment A) were created. Using a
two–sided Mann–Whitney test we ﬁnd that there is a statistical diﬀerence between
the treatments in overall mean consistency (p-value = 0:000). To examine the ef-
fects of experience the sample was divided into two categories: Subjects are deﬁned
to be inexperienced if they are in period 1–5 and experienced otherwise. Again the
two–sided Mann–Whitney test reveals that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in consis-
tency for inexperienced (p-value = 0:000) as well as for experienced (p-value = 0:002)
subjects.
Even if the S treatment has a signiﬁcantly higher degree of consistency it is evident
by studying Table 1 that the gap between the treatments is smaller in later periods
indicating that there is a possible positive time trend in the data for treatment A.
To investigate this closer we estimated a linear random eﬀects regression with the
consistency measure as the independent variable and including a time variable as the
dependent variable.9 Interestingly, the regression estimates in Table 2 reveal that
there is a positive time trend in the A treatment but not in the S treatment.
Table 2: Estimations on consistency






Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1:
We next report the fraction of groups in a selected sample with an assignment
of items according to the equilibrium prediction. This will also be a measure in the
closed interval [0;1]. By adopting the same statistical test as before we found that
there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two treatments when subjects are inex-
perienced (p-value = 0:011) but not when they are experienced (p-value = 0:954) or
9Since we are not interested in making forecasts we use linear regressions even though they might give
predictions outside [0;1] interval. Corresponding probit estimations reveal the same patters as reported
here.
7overall (p-value = 0:126). Our next observation is that exactly as for the consistency
measure, it is clear (from columns 4 and 5 of Table 1) that treatment S is closer to the
theoretical prediction in the ﬁrst periods whereas this gap is closed in later rounds.
Thus, one can expect that there is a positive time trend not only for the consistency
measure but also for the equilibrium measure. To investigate this in more detail
we estimated a linear random eﬀects regression using the group allocation dummy
as the dependent variable and including a time variable as an independent variable.
The regression output in Table 3 veriﬁes the above suspicion that there is a strong
positive time trend in the A treatment but not in the S treatment.







Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1:
It is also interesting to see how close, in terms of eﬃciency, each group was to
the equilibrium prediction. In line with Olson and Porter (1994) we calculate an











where ybi is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if subject b is assigned item i and
zero otherwise, and y∗




31 = 1 and y∗
bi = 0 for the remaining pairs (b;i)). Because the sum of valuations is
maximized when reports are consistent (see Section 2) the denominator in (2) will
always be weakly larger than the numerator. Hence, also this measure produces a
number in the closed interval [0;1].
Columns 6 and 7 in Table 1 show the mean eﬃciency by period in the S and
A treatment. The eﬃciency measure is quite similar across treatments, with only a
slight advantage for the static mechanism in early periods. To facilitate a statisti-
cal analysis we adopt the two-sided Mann–Whitney test as in the above. The test
demonstrates that there is a statistical advantage for the static mechanism when
subjects are inexperienced (p-value = 0:000) but not experienced (p-value = 0:6907).
8Overall there seems to be a advantage for the static mechanism (p-value = 0:001).
To investigate if there is a positive time trend in treatment A also for this measure
we adopt the the same methodology as for the equilibrium measure and estimate a
random eﬀects panel regression. The regression output in Table 4 reveals that there
is a signiﬁcant positive time trend in the A treatment but not in the S treatment.







Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1:
5 Conclusion
In summary we ﬁnd that the sealed bid mechanism dominates the ascending counter-
part in all measures reported here. The diﬀerence between the two auction formats
is more pronounced when subjects are inexperienced than when subjects are experi-
enced. This latter ﬁnding is further strengthen by the presence of signiﬁcant positive
time trend in the ascending treatment measures. No time trend is not found in the
sealed-bid treatment. It is therefore alluring to conclude that after a suitable number
of periods, the ascending bid mechanism will dominate the sealed bid counterpart.
One should however always be careful when extrapolating results and further exper-
imental results are needed to validate this claim. In regards to the policy dimension
it is risky to draw general conclusions from a single experiment and we are in general
unwilling to do so. But we think that it is safe to say that if an auction is to be
conducted just once, then the sealed bid mechanism is to prefer.
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10A Additional Tables
This Appendix reports the mean prices by period and treatment (see Table 5). We
also recall that the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices in our experimental setting
is given by the price vector (p1;p2;p3) = (0;20;60).
Table 5: Mean prices
Price item 1 Price item 2 Price item 3
Period A S A S A S
1 0.32 0.75 2.26 8.90 16.26 31.05
2 0.05 0.00 1.58 5.60 2.160 25.90
3 1.58 0.00 3.58 10.7 13.16 32.15
4 0.00 0.00 5.84 7.75 16.58 30.65
5 0.00 0.00 2.84 6.20 18.84 36.75
6 0.26 0.00 4.05 8.70 25.00 33.40
7 0.05 0.00 9.00 2.85 24.79 24.75
8 0.11 0.00 2.53 8.60 24.42 33.25
9 0.00 0.00 4.53 6.40 14.95 30.90
10 0.00 0.00 4.26 6.70 20.32 34.40
All periods 0.24 0.08 4.05 7.24 17.65 31.32
Period 1-5 0.39 0.15 3.22 7.83 13.40 31.30
Period 6-10 0.08 0.00 4.87 6.65 21.89 31.34
B A transcript of the instructions
In what follows we present a transcript of the instructions given to the subjects. Text
in italics is only for clariﬁcation and was not revealed to subjects. Note also that the
only piece of information that diﬀers between the two treatments is the description
of the auction formats (described in sections ”The Auction Sealed bid” and ”The
Auction Ascending”, below)
General information
Welcome to this experiment on economic decision making! Read the instructions
carefully. Do not talk during the experiment. If you have any questions, please
raise your hand and one of the experimenters will approach you so that you can ask
your question quietly. In the experiment you have the opportunity to earn money
that will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment. What ever happens in
the experiment you are guaranteed a ﬁxed earning of 50 kronor. In addition to this
you can earn much more. How much depends on yours and the other participants’
choices. In the experiment you will earn experimental ”daler”which will be exchanged
11for kronor at the exchange rate 2 daler = 1 kronor. The experiment consists of 10
rounds with the exact same structure. In addition to this there will be a practice
round in order for you to familiarize with the software. Before the ﬁrst round you will
be placed in a group with two other participants. You will meet in the ten rounds of
the experiment.
The Experiment
In each round of this experiment, you and the other two participants in your group
will participate in an Auction. The auction ends when you are assigned one of three
available items (denoted by A, B and C) or ”no item”. Objects A, B and C can only
be assigned to one of the three participants in your group. For example, item A
cannot be assigned to you and some other participant in the group. To the contrary,
several participants in the group can be allocated ”no item”.
Resale value
Items A, B and C have a resale value which is visible on your screen (see Ruta
1, Figure 2 [Ruta 1 Figure 3 in the ascending treatment]). Note that the other
participants in your group does not necessarily have the same resale values as you.
If you are allocated an item, then the item will automatically be resold at the end of
the round and you will receive the corresponding resale value in daler.
Price
If you are assigned item A, B or C, then you have to pay a price in daler. The prices
for items A, B and C will be determined automatically by a computer program
according to a predetermined rule which is based on the reports of all three members
of the group. The price of ”no item” is always zero.
Payoﬀ
Your payoﬀ in each round is given by the diﬀerence between the resale value and the
price of the item that you are assigned, i.e.:
payoﬀ = resale value – price
Information regarding your payoﬀ and the item assigned to you will be available on
your computer screen when the allocation procedure ends (see Figure 1). In addition,
your accumulated payoﬀ over all rounds will be available (see Ruta 2, Figure 2 [see
Ruta 2, Figure 3 in the ascending treatment]). The total earning after period 10
12will be paid out to you in cash before you leave (minimum amount 100 daler = 50
kronor).
Figure 1:
The Auction Sealed bid
The assignment of items A, B and C and the prices will be determined by the following
procedure:
Step 1 Please state on the computer, your willingness to pay for each item A, B and C
(an integer number between 0 and 120). See Ruta 3, Figure 2. Note that you
do not have to state any willingness to pay for ”no item” since it always equals
zero.
Step 2 When you have stated your willingness to pay for each item A, B and C please
press the ”Report” button (see Ruta 4, Figure 2).
Based on the willingness to pay that you and the other two participants have
stated, prices and an assignment of items A, B and C will be determined by a
computer program according to a predetermined rule. Each group member will be
awarded the item where the diﬀerence between the stated valuation and the calcu-
lated price is the highest.
The Auction Ascending
The assignment of items A, B, and C and the prices will be determined by a simple
procedure. In this procedure items A, B and C will have temporary prices which will
be modiﬁed until the ﬁnal prices can be determined (the temporary prices are visible
in Ruta 3, Figure 3). The process consists of the following steps:
13Figure 2:
Step 1 Given the temporary prices for items A, B and C, indicate on the computer
screen by clicking the check box which item(s) you would prefer (see Ruta 4,
Figure 3). If you do not want to be allocated any of the items you do not have
to click any of the items.
Step 2 Indicate one of the three alternatives in Ruta 5, Figure 3.
Step 3 When you have carried out Steps 1 and 2 press the ”Report” button (see Ruta
6, Figure 3).
Step 4 If each group member can be assigned an item from his/her reported demand
set, the auction is terminated and you will get your payoﬀ for that round (see
Figure 1). If this is not the case, the process continues to Step 5.
Step 5 Since it was impossible to ﬁnd an assignment in Step 4, several participants have
reported the same items in Steps 1 and 2. These participants shall now indicate
on the computer screen (see Ruta 7, Figure 3) the minimal price increment
14which makes some other item equivalent to the items indicated in Steps 1 and
2. This price increment must be an integer number larger than zero. Then
press the ”Report” button (see Ruta 6, Figure 3).
Step 6 Based on the reports in Step 5 the temporary prices will be updated automat-
ically by a computer program according to a predetermined rule. The updated
prices will be visible on your computer screen (see Ruta 3, Figure 3). The
process then restarts from Step 1 for you and the other two participants.
Figure 3:
15